The Afghan Military Forces

In November 2001, Kabul had been liberated from the Taliban and the Northern Alliance’s Marshall Fahim Khan, had staked his claim in Kabul as the Minister of Defense.  To some Warlords, and their Commanders, this was acceptable but to others, old grievances and ethnic tensions, once again, quickly remerged and some refused to allow their militia to pledge their allegiance to a Tajik Minister of Defense.  

Those units that supported Marshal Fahim Khan went on to become known as the MoD funded, Afghan Military Forces and were subsequently stood down by 2005 through the UN DDR program. Those Units that did not pledge their loyalty, became known as the Independent Units. Theysubsequently became the subject of the UN DIAG program but in the interim received no public funding which encouraged them to develop other sources of revenues[1]. Rightly or wrongly the attention in the Bonn Agreement focused on those in the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) and the the independent units drifted out of public view.[2]

The American military took the lead on creating the ANA, to be over seen by a Brigadier General, and accepted assistance from the French who trained the Officers, the British who trained the NCO’s and more recently the Canadian Military. A new Army was deemed necessary to provide the Government with access to a loyal, reliable western style, ethnically representative, professionally trained force. Similar to Iraq, it was decided at the time, that the new government would not be able to reform the existing forces and that it had to start a fresh. However, unlike Iraq, the rational was that the ANA would be trained and deployed in parallel to stepping down the AMF through the UN donor funded DDR program to avoid destabilizing the Country through local security vacums. At the time, the AMF commanders were maintaining security through out the Country, on their individual terms but providing some sense of stability – but at all times they remained loyal to their Commander and the respective Warlords.

Recruitment

The ANA personnel pass a recruitment process before attending 15 weeks of basic and specialist training prior to being assigned to their Unit. Unlike the Police, the ANA are deployable nationally, out of one of almost 60 locations, in Country.  In the Unit, they are mentored by embedded international, training personnel totaling between 3,600 - 5,200 of which most are US National Guards. The recent surge in trainers is to increase the throughput of personnel through the Kabul Military Training Centre to around 2,000 personnel a month.  Of these, five battalions, each comprising between 300 to 600 soldiers are reported to be able to operate on their own but will continue to be mentored by embedded ISAF and Coalition troops. This optimism is however,, not shared privately by others who discreetly predict that it could be another ten years before the personnel are sufficiently trained and mature to be truly operationally independent.  In Feb 2007, the NYT, whilst on an ANA patrol discovered police officers in Uruzgan cultivating poppy within the compound's walls, openly participating in the heroin trade. The Afghan Army squad that visited them did nothing.

Retention

Too many, the discipline and the lifestyle is too tough and some decide to leave. Others, classed as AWOL, are often found to be late back as they have been delivering their salaries to their families, often several days away, or sometimes found at home helping out during harvest time.  Efforts are now being made to pay troops through bank accounts to assist the families and improve the troops welfare.

Pay for soldiers has recently been increased from about $85, $35 above the reported national average, to $115 a month to counter the number of personnel deciding not to reengage at the end of their three year period  -chosing instead to seek alternative, better paid and safer, incomes available back home.  The pay may be comparable to a policeman but for those from the cities, particularly Kabul, where an english speaking driver can earn $250 a month, the salary is not attractive .  This in turn implies  that the ANA salary attracts rural recruits contributing further to the public’s poor perception of a military career and its respect for the work that the ANA is doing. 

Reported desertion rates have fallen from a reported high of 25% in 2005/6 to around 15% but the target is to reduce them to 10%.  John Daniels of the U.S.-led training program, said the desertion rate had declined significantly, to 14 percent. However, other NATO officials say that when the recruits, who abandoned the ANA during basic training are counted, the rate jumps to 40%.

The current quoted force of 46,000, less desertions, of which 50% are deployable, comprise operational Kandaks, (battalions) operating under five regional commands in Gardez, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar and Mazar –I –Sharif.  The creation of a new Army has since identified issues that have led to changes in training to provide more enhanced training, the need for specialized logistical and support services and a means to become economically sustainable in the mid to long term. The US military has begun to procure armored Humvees and better Kevlar helmets and body armor to equip new elite Afghan infantry battalions at a cost of some $47m . Work is now underway to train an elite Commando force, comprising 3,900 men to operate in six batallions to provide a Special Forces capability in each military region leaving an additional unit for other MoD tasks. The personnel will receive up to 12 weeks specialist training, based over seas in Countries such as Jordan, higher quality kit and weapons and taught by French and US trainers. 

Back on the frontline, the ANA is reported to be able to fight on their own, but lacks three things: secure communications, air support and medical expertise, according to  Brig. Gen. Douglas A. Pritt, who oversees the U.S.-led ANA training program. In contrast, Canadian Brig.-Gen. Tim Grant said that there is a plan and schedule in place to ensure the ANA is trained and up to speed before a possible Canadian pullout in 2009 but the jury is still out on whether they will be ready to go it alone in 2009 if the international assistance forces’ left. Some repeat that it could take another decade. 

The public date for completion of the task of building the ANA is continuously being revised, varying between 2007 and 2010 depending on the most current circumstances and the level of insurgency at that time. However in the main, the date, unlike almost anything else in Afghanistan, occasionally comes forward.  The number of ANA personnel has always been consistent at around 70,000[3] but recently the Afghan MoD has been saying that this should be met by 2008, freeing up the requirement for ISAF personnel[4] but privately suggesting that the force should be expanded to over 200,000 to meet the demands placed on it by the growing insurgency. Unofficially, U.S. military officials has been quoted as saying that they would like to spend $5.9 billion in 07/08 to expand both the Afghan army and the police to fund training and equipping them over the following three years.    

Build it and they will come

Budget demands, the uncertainty created through always waiting for the results of the “Supplemental”, and the reality that what is being created is financially unsustainable, with out long term foreign assistance will probably prevent large increases of the size suggested by the Mod but there is “no harm in asking”.  In early 2006 the thought of a national air corp was unthinkable but recent announcements are now talking of a capability which will comprise 200 fighter, survelianace and transport aircraft.

 Of all the original Security Sector Pillars of Reform, the ANA appears the most effective, sustainable and is clearly moving in the right direction albeit with a few teething problems.  The ANA is in the frontline and taking casualties fighting for their Country. In 2006, 331 ANA personnel were killed and a further 861 were injured in action.